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CONTINUITY OF CONGRESS: A PLAY IN THREE
STAGES
Howard M. Wasserman'
I. COMPLEXITIES OF CONTINUITY OF CONGRESS
Whither Congress in the event of a terrorist attack? Much of the
conversation about "continuity in government" has focused on the
Presidency-on ensuring the survival of one individual in whom the
Executive power under the Constitution is vested. The focus has been, in
the words of President George W. Bush, to put "measures in place that
should somebody be successful in attacking Washington, D.C., there's an
ongoing government."1  But when the President talks about ongoing
government, he talks only of an ongoing President and executive branch.
Most of the security efforts on September 11, 2001, concerned the
protection of the President, Vice President, and Cabinet members in the
Presidential line of succession.2 In the months following the September
11 terrorist attacks, Vice President Richard B. Cheney spent a significant
amount of time in undisclosed secure locations to ensure his safety as the
preferred Presidential successor.'
In fact, evidence now suggests that Congress was the terrorist target
that morning. United Flight 93, which crashed in a field in western
Pennsylvania after passengers fought back against the hijackers, appears• 4
to have been headed for the Capitol. What ultimately saved the Capitol
' Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. J.D., 1997,
B.S., 1990, Northwestern University. Thanks to Thomas Baker and Matthew Mirow for
comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Press Release, Presidential Q&A with Pool Reporters (Mar. 1, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020301-5.html.
2. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY
L.J. 281, 281 (2003).
3. See id. at 294.
4. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, THE CONGRESS 2 (2003), available at
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/FirstReport.pdf; see also id. app. II, at 34
(quoting reports of interviews indicating that the fourth plane headed for Congress);
Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Congress: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Congressional Continuity
Hearing] (statement of Norman J. Ornstein), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id2565 ("Plotters of the September 1 1th attacks have told the
media that the fourth plane, United flight 93, was headed for the Capitol .... "); id.
(statement of Samuel Wright), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id
=909&wit id=2570 ("But for the heroic resistance of the passengers, the aircraft might
very well have crashed into the Capitol, killing hundreds of members of the Senate
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and members of Congress was that the flight departed forty-one minutes
late, which allowed passengers to learn the fates of the three other
hijacked planes and to attempt to retake the plane . Otherwise, United
Flight 93 might have crashed into the Capitol sometime between 9:00 and
9:30 a.m., when the (then sparsely populated) House of Representatives
was opening session and several leadership, committee, and private
meetings were taking place throughout the building.' Yet, little was said
about implementing measures to ensure a continuing or ongoing
Congress, at least until the Continuity of Government Commission, a
private nonpartisan group comprised of academics and former
government officials jointly established by the American Enterprise
Institute and the Brookings Institution, issued a report on the subject in
June 2003.'
Continuity of government cannot be understood or approached as a
monolithic problem. Separation of powers remains the dominant
structural precept of the National Government established by the
Constitution." Ensuring that there is an ongoing Federal Government
means ensuring that there are three ongoing branches-three ongoing
distinct governing bodies -each with a different nature and structure and
each with different constitutional, statutory, and administrative rules
and House of Representatives."); id. (statement of Thad Hall), http://judiciary.senate.
gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&witid=2567 ("The September 11th terrorist attacks could
have been far worse had one of the airplanes hijacked by the terrorists struck the United
States Capitol. The attack would have come just as the House was going into session and
the House Appropriations Committee met in the Capitol building.").
5. See CONTINUITY OF GOv'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 2.
6. See id. at 2-3.
7. See generally id. at iii. Several constitutional amendments addressing
congressional continuity were introduced in Congress in the months after September 11,
but none were enacted or even seriously considered. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 67, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R.J. Res. 77, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 30, 107th Cong. (2001).
8. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 314 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982)
(arguing that the Constitution "so contrive[ed] the interior structure of the government, as
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping
each other in their proper places"); see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A
PARTY SYSTEM 52 (1969) (arguing that systemic protections in the Constitution were to
be provided by the "classic doctrine of separation of powers"); Steven G. Calabresi, The
Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 163 (1995) ("[W]e
must remember that our Constitution is built on presidentiallseparation of powers
premises .... ); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE
L.J. 679, 688 (1997) ("[T]he separation of powers principle serves mostly as a line-drawing
tool to mark the boundary between one institution's constitutional tasks and those
reserved to another."); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential
Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345, 359-60 (2001) ("Power was to be divided among three
coordinate branches of the federal government; each branch was to have its own realm of
power and was to be provided with the formal tools, means, and will necessary to protect
that realm.").
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governing that structure and the continuity of its operations. Separation
of powers means there can be no continuity of the Federal Government,
consistent with our constitutional understanding of it, unless there is
continuity of all three branches, in particular both political branches to
enact new legislation. Absent a functioning Congress, the Federal
Government functions not as it was structurally designed, but as a
dictatorship of the executive.9
Executive continuity involves a narrower focus, because the Executive
power of the United States is reposited in a single individual."' The need
for executive succession arises from the death or disability of one
individual, the President;" the death or disability of a second individual,
the Vice President, triggers a statutory chain reaction of executive and
legislative officers in the line of succession. 2 Presidential continuity
focuses on the orderly transfer of power from one individual to another.
Congress can ensure Presidential continuity if it can establish a proper
line of succession (something few believe Congress has done yet) 3 and
9. Compare Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment to Guarantee a Functioning Congress: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Constitutional Amendment
Hearing] (statement of Sanford Levinson), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=1022&witid=2919 ("[S]hould we, then, be faced with a Congress that is
unable, for whatever reason, to function, it is almost a logical-and most certainly, an
empirical-truth that power would flow to what can only be called dictatorship by a
presumably functioning Executive Branch."), with H.R. REP. NO. 108-404, pt. II, at 5
(2004) (downplaying the danger of such a dictatorship, largely in light of the power of
Congress, either in rump or reconstituted form, to impeach a President who abuses
executive authority).
10. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. t ("The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 8, at 418
(Alexander Hamilton) ("The first thing which strikes our attention is that the executive
authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate."); Fitzgerald, supra
note 8, at 756-57; Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1231, 1242 (1994).
II. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 ("In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.").
12. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000); see also Wasserman, supra note 8, at
354.
13. See Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Presidency:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin. and the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th
Cong (2003) [hereinafter Presidential Continuity Hearing] (statement of Akhil Reed
Amar), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=914&wit-id=2603 ("The current
presidential succession act ... is in my view a disastrous statute, an accident waiting to
happen."); id. (statement of Dr. John C. Fortier), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=94&wit id=2604; id. (statement of Howard M. Wasserman),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=914&wit-id2605 (arguing that the underlying
premises of § 19 have proven theoretically and factually incorrect over time); see also
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 136 (1995); Calabresi, supra note 8, at 156; John C.
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provide for the security of some or all successors such that some
designated individual survives an attack and can assume the Executive
14power.
By contrast, the legislative power under the Constitution is reposited
in an institution, Congress, composed of two distinct subinstitutions, the
Senate and the House of Representatives. 5 It is technically inaccurate to
refer to continuity of Congress, as opposed to continuity of the Senate
and continuity of the House; the two bodies possess distinct
characteristics, are governed by distinct constitutional provisions, and
arguably require distinct approaches to continuity." Moreover,
continuity of Congress demands continuity of operations in both houses;
bicameralism means there is no continuity of Congress, and thus of the
Federal Government, unless both the Senate and the House of
Representatives are able to function."
Because there are 100 senators and 435 representatives, the death or
disability of one or a small number of these officials does not legitimately
threaten continuity; it takes a larger, more comprehensive and
destructive attack on the institution itself to disrupt its operations. It also
means the complete destruction of Congress-the death of every single
member of that body-is somewhat less likely; a rump Congress of some
number of members likely would survive the attack. 8 On the other hand,
Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53
CATH. U. L. REV. 993,994-95 (2004); Wasserman, supra note 8, at 409-10.
14. See Presidential Continuity Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Akhil Reed
Amar), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=914 (proposing cabinet position of
Assistant Vice President, whose role would be to be "in the line of succession but out of
the line of fire"); id. (statement of Howard M. Wasserman), http:l/judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=914&wit-id2605 (proposing similar position of First Secretary); see also
Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 13, at 1010.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives."); see also Lawson, supra note 10, at 1239 ("Congress must make
whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so
that Congress must make them.").
16. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 8, at 316 (James Madison) ("The
remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different branches; and to
render them by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common
dependence on the society, will admit.").
17. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States .... "). Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the
Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) ("The federal
government could not pass laws, appoint officials, or enter into treaties without a
Congress, Senate, and a President.").
18. Reports suggest that the Capitol was not full on the morning of September 11.
CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 2-3. Of course, had the hijackings
[Vol. 53:949
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such a large number of members also means that continuity of Congress
cannot be attained by a simple transfer of power from one individual to
another, because it is the institution whose survival and continuity must
be ensured.' 9  Institutional continuity depends on a wider range of
constitutional and statutory solutions.
Continuity of Congress is an umbrella term for a three-stage process.
The first stage is immediate continuity-the hours, days, and first week
after a terrorist or military attack directed at Washington, D.C., and the
Federal Government. 2" The second stage is repopulation, focusing on
filling seats rendered vacant by the deaths of members in both houses of
Congress, restoring both houses to full working capacity, and allowing
Congress to move forward as a fully functioning bicameral legislature.2'
Repopulation can be divided into two parts: interim and final. Final
repopulation is the end stage of continuity, the point at which vacant
seats would be filled by replacements chosen by the ordinary means of
selection for both houses, direct popular election.22 Congress is not
repopulated in a manner that retains the populist nature of the body,
especially the House of Representatives, if a substantial number of seats
remains either vacant or occupied by members chosen by means other
21than popular election at the state or district level.
Interim repopulation bridges the gap between immediate continuity
and final repopulation; it places someone in the vacant seat, but via a
24fundamentally different selection procedure. The importance of the
interim repopulation stage turns on how quickly a popular election can
be held in the aftermath of a terrorist attack; the more quickly elections
occurred one week earlier, the plane might have struck the Capitol when the President of
Mexico was addressing a joint session of Congress. See id. at 3. The simultaneous death of
every member of Congress also is less likely because members frequently are away from
Washington, given their responsibilities to constituents in their home states and districts
and the fact that Congress often is not in session.
19. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1892) (stating that the capacity of a
house of Congress to transact business "does not depend upon the disposition or assent or
action of any single member").
20. See infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
21. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 305-06 ("The structural question [with respect to
repopulation] will be what processes can and should be followed to replace those killed ...
."1).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. I ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years ...
."); id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the Several States .... "). Depending on the
timing of the attack and the amount of time remaining on the term for a given seat, final
repopulation may await the election of a seat holder in the regularly scheduled election for
that seat.
23. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
2004]
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can take place, the shorter the interim repopulation period and, perhaps,
the less the need for that period. The model for two-stage repopulation
is the Senate, where governors have the power to make appointments to
vacant seats until an election can be held to fill the seat with a duly
25
elected member. Unfortunately, no similar appointment provision
exists in the House, where only a new election can fill a vacant seat.26
Each of these three stages requires distinct procedures that can be
established via different mechanisms. Some elements of congressional
continuity may require constitutional amendment, some only statutory
enactment, and some only changes to the rules of proceeding of each
house.27  This raises questions as to the venue in which continuity
procedures should be established28 and, in the case of a constitutional
amendment, the level of detail to be provided in that amendment.29
Importantly, Congress must not be reluctant to amend the Constitution if
an amendment is the only way to grant the unquestioned power to
establish necessary continuity procedures.30
It might be quite difficult to draft a single constitutional amendment
(or even a series of amendments) to address the multifaceted concerns of
congressional continuity.3 Congress and/or the states would be forced to
follow a piecemeal approach to continuity at the risk of losing some
12elements of the overall plan. Congress could, for example, draft an
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2 ("[T]he legislature of any State may empower
the executive thereof to make temporary appointment[s] until the people fill the vacancies
by election as the legislature may direct."); see infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4; see infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings .... "); Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of
Sanford Levinson), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1022&wit-id=2919.
28. See Wasserman, supra note 8, at 347-48 (stating that rules and procedures for
selection of federal officials may be established and detailed in the Constitution itself or in
framework legislation enacted on selection issues that have been punted to Congress).
29. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 24 (recommending that the
amendment be concise, granting Congress power to legislate within broad limits); id. at 25
(describing more detailed proposals).
30. See Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Sanford
Levinson), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1022&witid=2919 ("[I]t rejects
the very wisdom of Washington and other members of his generation to believe that
amendment is unthinkable or even that an unrealistically high burden of proof should be
placed on those who propose amendment.").
31. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 8, at 194 (James Madison) (describing
the "difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to the
Convention").
32. In contrast to congressional continuity, Presidential continuity procedures can be
established in a single legislative act (incorporating multiple issues and provisions) by
drafting a statute either amending or repealing and replacing the Presidential Succession
[Vol. 53:949
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amendment explicitly empowering governors to appoint temporary
members to the House of Representatives whenever a critical number of
seats have been left vacant due to death or long-term disability and
establishing a period within which elections must be held to permanentlyS33
fill those vacancies. Such an amendment specifically addresses interim
and final repopulation, but not immediate continuity during the first
week after the attack, which must be addressed by a separate enactment.
An alternative is Senator John Cornyn's current proposed
constitutional amendment granting Congress a general power to
"provide for the case of death or inability... in the event that one-fourth
of either House are killed or incapacitated, declaring who shall serve
until the disability is removed, or a new Member is elected. 3 4 This is the
correct approach in that it uses broad language to punt the entire issue
(all three stages and all underlying elements) to Congress to address, in
its discretion, in a single, uniform, and wholesale manner through its
statute-and rule-making powers.3 5
However, the use of too-general language may create problems. On
one hand, a general power grant must be read in light of and consistent
with other constitutional limitations absent express overruling or
repealing language. Article I provides that House vacancies are to be
filled by special election.36 While the purpose of Senator Cornyn's
Act of 1947. See Presidential Continuity Hearing, supra note 13 (testimony of Dr. John C.
Fortier), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=914&wit_=2604.
33. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 67, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing a constitutional
amendment empowering governors to appoint House members within seven days
whenever twenty-five percent or more of the members are unable to fulfill their duties,
with appointees serving until a special election is held within ninety days); H.R.J. Res. 77,
107th Cong. (2001) (same); S.J. Res. 30, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing similar
amendment, with fifty percent threshold). These amendments grant Congress the power
to enforce the new constitutional provision by appropriate legislation.
34. S.J. Res. 23, 108th Cong. (2003); see also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra
note 4, at 24 (proposing amendment providing that "Congress shall have the power to
regulate by law the filling of vacancies that may occur in the House of Representatives and
Senate in the event that a substantial number of members are killed or incapacitated").
Senator Cornyn's plan is pending in the Senate as of this writing. But even if it were to
pass the Senate, it is unlikely to pass the House, given the overwhelming rejection in June
2004 by the House of House Joint Resolution 83, which proposed a more detailed
constitutional amendment that included House appointments for vacant and incapacitated
seats. See 150 CONG. REC. H3665-81 (daily ed. June 2, 2004) (recording defeat of House
Joint Resolution 83 by 194-221 margin).
35. See Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Howard M.
Wasserman), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1022&wit_id=2918 (arguing
that Senator Cornyn's proposal "takes the correct approach in utilizing a short, broad
constitutional grant of power to Congress to address the catastrophic attack scenario and
to establish appropriate procedures to ensure the continuity of Congress").
36. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4; see also Wasserman, supra note 2, at 305
("Representatives must be popularly elected by the voters.., and vacancies are filled by
20041
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resolution is to supersede that provision with regard to vacancies created
in the mass-destruction scenario, the text of the proposed amendment
does not obviously achieve that result,37 at least with regard to filling
vacant seats.38 Without language expressly superseding the Article I
Special Election Clause, implementing legislation providing for House
appointments to vacant seats, although passed pursuant to this new
amendment, arguably runs afoul of the earlier limitation.
On the other hand, if the general power grant can supersede Article I
as to procedures for filling House vacancies, it arguably could supersede
other explicit constitutional provisions as they relate to continuity after
an attack. For example, the amendment could empower Congress to
provide by law that mid-level officers from various executive branch
departments will serve as temporary members of Congress in the wake of
an attack without having to resign their executive offices, in violation of
the Incompatibility Clause.39  More extremely, it might empower
Congress to provide that only White males who announce a belief in the
Trinity may be appointed to fill House vacancies or that no nineteen-
special elections before those same voters at a time and place established by the state
executive.").
37. Proponents of Senator Cornyn's current language might make two arguments: (1)
the history underlying the amendment will make clear the amendment's purpose of
superseding Article I, Section 2; and (2) a provision for interim appointments would not
run afoul of Article I because the appointees only would be acting members of the House
and the vacancies ultimately will be filled by "members" selected by new popular election.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, ct. 6 ("Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President .... ."). The problem then becomes that the
Constitution does not provide for acting members of the House or Senate, only for
members. Cf id. (providing that, in the event of a double Presidential vacancy, Congress
may "declar[e] what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly" (emphasis added)); id. amend. XXV, § 3 (establishing process whereby the
Vice President discharges the Executive power as acting President when the President
declares a temporary inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office). On the
other hand, the general power grant may be read to empower Congress to create a class of
acting legislators, absent a contrary limitation on such a category elsewhere in the
Constitution.
38. None of these concerns attaches with respect to seats whose members have been
disabled, as opposed to killed, in the attack. The general statement of congressional
power effectively grants discretion to Congress, unimpeded by other constitutional
language, to declare who shall serve in a House or Senate seat until the member's
disability is removed. The Constitution elsewhere is silent as to disabled members of
Congress. See infra Part III.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
[Vol. 53:949
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year-old woman may vote in the special election, all in derogation of
specific constitutional limitations ".
Congress obviously is not about to enact such prohibitions. The point
is that a broad power grant cannot be read to authorize Congress to
override some constitutional provisions (as to the mode and manner of
filling House vacancies) without authorizing it to override others (as to
equal protection, the right to vote, or separation of powers). Limiting
language in the proposed amendment should resolve the problem. For
example, we might add to Senator Cornyn's proposed language a
provision that Congress may act "notwithstanding" other limitations on
the mode and manner of selection or filling vacancies or on the rules of
proceeding in each house with regard to the quorum. This language
limits the supersedure to its intended scope; the amendment overrides
some constitutional provisions (the Special Elections Clause or the
Quorum Clause) as intended, without being, potentially, too broad.41
This article emphasizes that continuity of Congress demands a range of
action in several venues in order to establish distinct procedures for three
distinct stages. My focus will not be on the specific forum in which
continuity procedures should be established or the specific language used
to establish those procedures. Rather, the focus will be on understanding
the three stages of continuity and the general rules and procedures that
each stage demands. The point is that Congress, in making structural
choices, must take a broad view of the concept of legislative continuity in
order to understand and address all three stages of the process.
40. See id. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States."); id. amend. XIX ("The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of sex."); id. amend. XXVI ("The right of citizens of the
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age."); see also Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously
discriminating between individuals or groups.").
41. Another way to achieve the same result would be to divide the amendment into
two sections: section one would repeat the exact language of Article I, Section 2, Clause 4;
section two would contain the current language of Senator Cornyn's proposed
amendment. This makes explicit and uniform the method of establishing rules for filling
vacancies in the House, both in the ordinary case and in this special situation. At the same
time, placing these distinct provisions together explicitly limits the reach of the new power
granted to Congress to change the mode and manner of appointment. I thank Thomas
Baker for suggesting this structural approach.
2004]
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II. THREE STAGES OF CONTINUITY OF CONGRESS
A. Immediate Continuity
Immediate continuity focuses on the hours, days, and first week after a
catastrophic terrorist attack on Congress and the Federal Government.
This is the initial period during which the national leadership in all three
branches attempts to assess the physical and human damage, determine
which government leaders have been killed, injured, or incapacitated by
that attack, and decide how to proceed. It would be impossible to
replace members of either house of Congress; replacement procedures
could not work that fast, and more basically, the condition or status of
most members would be unknown. The search and rescue at the World
Trade Center and Pentagon after September 11 shows that it will take
days or weeks to dig through the rubble and begin to assess the damage.
Likewise, it may be days before a successful biological or chemical
attack, such as the release of anthrax or ricin in congressional buildings,
takes its toll on members and staffers.
The first days after an attack will be dominated by the President, the
executive branch, and emergency first responders (the military, CIA,
FBI, FEMA, and other executive agency personnel, as well as the
National Guard, state and local law enforcement, and public safety
personnel) exercising their discretion under existing laws, regulations,
practices, and appropriations.42 We expect little legislative activity in
these few days; indeed, even some members of Congress suggest that
enacting new legislation may be a bad idea in the heightened tension and
emotion of this period.4 ' The immediate role of Congress may be largely
42. Presidential continuity is the more immediate concern after an attack. See
Presidential Continuity Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Dr. John C. Fortier),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=914&wit-id=2604 ("After an attack, there
may be a need for a new president to act immediately."); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-503,
at 9 (2004) ("Congress has already granted the President, by statute, wide authority to act
in emergency circumstances."). Presidential and congressional continuity are necessarily
linked in the worst-case scenario of the death or disability of the President, Vice President,
and every Cabinet member enumerated in the statutory line of succession, perhaps along
with a substantial portion of Congress. If the Speaker and President pro tempore remain
in the line of Presidential succession, the Speaker, whether one who survived the attack or
who was selected anew by the skeletal Congress, becomes an eligible successor under § 19
and may become acting president. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 299 ("[Tjhe naming of
the new Speaker provides the means for naming a new acting president."); see also
Presidential Continuity Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Howard M. Wasserman),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=914&wt-id=2605 (same).
43. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy), http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfm?id=909&witid50 ("Perhaps
we can survive a brief interim period without a functioning House of Representatives,
[Vol. 53:949
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symbolic, as when members of both houses gathered on the Capitol steps
immediately after 9/11 "to demonstrate to the nation and the world that
the work of the American government would continue.",
44
This symbolic role is not insignificant. Moreover, the fact that the
Federal Government can, if absolutely necessary, operate for these few
days without Congress does not mean that we should accept the absence
of Congress as inevitable. If it is feasible to establish procedures that will
allow Congress to function in the immediate aftermath of the attack,
those procedures should be established.
The key to immediate continuity is empowering whatever rump or
skeletal Congress survives the attack. The obstacle is that the rump
Congress must operate consistent with the rules of that institution,
specifically the requirement that each house attain a quorum to do
business, which the Constitution defines as "a Majority of each" house.
In order for the rump Congress to function as a legislative body, both
houses must attain the required majority. James Madison defended the
use of a majority, as opposed to a larger number, as the quorum because
it better enables the legislature to act in "cases where justice or the
general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to
be pursued. 46 The days after a terrorist attack on Congress are a period
in which both justice and the general good require an active government,
which means a functioning Congress.
Imagine that 101 representatives and thirty-one senators survive a
terrorist attack uninjured. The open constitutional question is the
quorum denominator. The Constitution does not define whether the
quorum requires a majority of authorized seats in a house or a majority
of occupied seats, of living, selected, and sworn members of that house.
The post-attack rump Congress can function only if the Constitution
allows the House to find a quorum when fifty-one members are present,
the Senate when sixteen senators are present.
One possibility is that the denominator is authorized seats in each
house, 435 in the House, 100 in the Senate. Such a constitutional
requirement renders a quorum unattainable, even if every member is
present, because each house has fewer members than a majority of total
especially since post-tragedy legislative actions might be governed more by emotion than
by sound policy judgments.").
44. See id. (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch), http://judiciary.senate.gov/member
statement.cfm?id=909&wit_id=51.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 8, at 358 (James Madison) (responding to
arguments for a quorum higher than a majority and arguing for the need for the legislature
to act in "cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or
active measures to be pursued").
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seats. It is impossible for Congress, and therefore the Federal
Government, to function, resulting in a unilateral executive dictatorship.
Alternatively, the denominator could be seats presently occupied by
living members. 4' The current Senate rule defines the quorum as a
"majority of the Senators duly chosen and sworn," distinct from the
established, but unoccupied, seats themselves. In the House, the
current parliamentary interpretation is a "majority of those Members
chosen, sworn, and living, whose membership has not been terminated by
resignation or by action of the House., 49 A different House rule provides
that "upon the death, resignation,... or [other] removal of a Member,
the whole number of the House [is to] be adjusted accordingly.""' The
denominator is the whole number of the House, but the whole number of
the House includes only elected, sworn, living members currently
occupying seats. Finally, House rules provide that during quorum calls
the "names of Members" are to be called;" the focus on members in the
House rules is distinct from seats and suggests a permissible denominator
of chosen, sworn, living occupants of those seats.
The more expansive parliamentary understanding of the quorum
requirement is a product of the similar historical crisis in the functioning
of Congress during the Civil War. The House redefined the quorum
denominator at the beginning of the war in 1861, out of concern that a
majority of possible seats, which could have included representatives
from the seceded southern States, could not be obtained. Speaker
Galusha A. Grow ruled that the quorum would be based on a
denominator of those legitimately chosen and sworn, a measure that
52excluded the vacant Southern seats from the denominator. The Senate
followed suit in 1864.-s Ultimately, both houses during and after the Civil
War would have been able to maintain quorums even on whole-house
denominators, thanks to the seating of senators and representatives from
the loyalist government of western Virginia (what became the State of• • • 54
West Virginia).
47. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 300-01.
48. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, R. VI (2000), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule06htm.
49. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 9.
50. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 108TH CONG. R. XX(5)(c), at 31
(2003), available at http://www.house.gov/rules/108rules.pdf.
51. See id.
52. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 8-9.
53. See id. at 9.
54. John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 375, 382 (2001); id. at 378 n.ll (stating that the two congresses immediately after the
Civil War contained absolute majorities of both houses, even if the South was counted in
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However, historical practice during the First Congress suggests a
contrary conclusion.55 Congress met for the first time on Wednesday,
March 4, 1789.56 Neither house had a quorum on that date so both
adjourned, doing so repeatedly for the next month.57 The House of
Representatives finally attained a quorum of thirty on April 1, and the
Senate attained a quorum of twelve on April 6.58 The actions of the
Senate during this period are instructive. On March 11, 1789, the eight
present senators, on behalf of themselves and the eighteen present
House members, sent a letter to twelve absent senators, emphasizing the
"utmost importance" of a quorum sufficient to proceed to business and
requesting that the absent senators communicate "information of their
situation" and attend as soon as possible. This request or compulsion
for attendance could be sent only to a member of the Senate-someone
the denominator); see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia
Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 300 (2002).
55. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 3-4 (1997) ("[l]n a very real sense it can be said that the First
Congress was a sort of continuing constitutional convention, and not simply because so
many of its members ... had helped to compose or to ratify the Constitution itself."); 2
FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1765-1895, at 176-77 (1901) (noting the number of members of the First Congress who had
participated in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia or in the ratifying
conventions).
56. See CURRIE, supra note 55, at 3; THORPE, supra note 55, at 176; see also 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 3 (Linda
Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. March 4, 1789,
is understood as the point at which the Constitution came into operation. See Owings v.
Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820) (holding that the Constitution of the United
States came into operation on the first Wednesday in March, 1789); see also THORPE,
supra note 55, at 175 n.1. But see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 17, at 37 (arguing that
the Constitution became law over a period of time, as different aspects of the document
became active at different points between August 1788 and April 1789).
57. See CURRIE, supra note 55, at 3; THORPE, supra note 55, at 176; DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 56, at 3 (Senate Journal showing eight senators present); id. at 3
(Journal of the House of Representatives, showing thirteen representatives, less than a
"quorum of the whole number").
58. See THORPE, supra note 55, at 176; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 56, at 7
(showing on April 6, 1789, the presence of a "majority of the whole number of Senators of
the United States"); id. at 7 (showing on April 1, 1789, in the House of Representatives "a
quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole number, being present").
59. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 56, at 3-5 & n.2 (noting a similar letter
sent March 18, 1789, to eight absent senators). The first letter was addressed to Tristram
Dalton, William Paterson, Jonathan Elmer, George Read, Richard Bassett, Charles
Carroll, John Henry, Richard Henry Lee, William Grayon, Ralph Izard, Pierce Butler, and
James Gunn. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 56, at 4. The second letter was
sent to Elmer, Paterson, Read, Bassett, Carroll, Henry, Lee, and Grayson. See id. at 5.
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living and already selected for his seat and able to assume that position
once he presented himself and was sworn."
The denominator for the first Senate quorum did not include seats for
Rhode Island and North Carolina, neither of which had yet ratified the
Constitution.6' As such, twenty-two was the maximum quorum
denominator, reflecting the total number of seats in the Senate, requiring
twelve for a quorum. However, New York did not select its two senators
until July 1789; the two Senate seats from New York were vacant when
the Senate convened in March.6 2 Thus, a denominator based only on
selected members holding seats in March would have been twenty, and a
majority of eleven would have established a quorum. But the Senate did
not find a quorum from the eleven senators present on March 28;63 it
found a quorum only after a twelfth Senator, Richard Henry Lee of
Virginia, presented his credentials on April 6 .
64 In other words, the first
Senate demanded a majority of the twenty-two possible seats for a
quorum, whether or not those seats had, in fact, been filled.
But consider the problems that could have arisen during this period if
that larger denominator were constitutionally mandated. Although
opponents of the Constitution generally fell into line once a given state
had ratified 65 the influence of Anti-Federalists continued, risking, in the
eyes of Federalists, "much mischief." 66  In New York, ongoing
disagreements between Federalists and Anti-Federalists prevented the
legislature from choosing electors to vote in the first Presidential election
and from selecting senators until July.67 Suppose other states similarly
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (providing for the power of less than a majority to
"compel the Attendance of absent Members" (emphasis added)).
61. See THORPE, supra note 55, at 177.
62. See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 39, 48
(1994); see also DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 56, at 91 (showing the first
presentation of Senator Rufus King of New York on July 25, 1789).
63. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 56, at 6 (reflecting the first appearance
of Senator Jonathan Elmer of New Jersey, an eleventh senator, but the adjournment of
business because of the absence of a quorum).
64. See id. at 6-7.
65. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 306 (1966)
("Perhaps this is endemic to America; once the vote is counted, everybody wants to be in
the parade.").
66. See THORPE, supra note 55, at 175.
67. See BOWEN, supra note 65, at 306 (describing New York's grudging, conditions-
filled ratification, including suggestion by one Anti-Federalist that New York declare its
right to withdraw from the Union after a number of years if suggested amendments were
not considered); KURODA, supra note 62, at 39 ("No state offers a better example of how
rival political interests and ideas affected the choice of [federal officials] in 1789 than New
York, a late, reluctant, and divided supporter of the Constitution."); id. at 48-49
(discussing lessons learned in New York from the long debates and the lack of
participation in the first Presidential election); id. at 48 (discussing belated selection of two
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had delayed choosing senators and representatives. If those unfilled
seats must count in the quorum denominator, the few entrenched
opponents of the Constitution could have prevented Congress, and by
extension the Federal Government, from ever transacting business by
depriving it of the machinery of governance: a bicameral Congress and a
President to pass laws and appoint officials. 8
The Constitution established a majority (rather than some larger
number) as the legislative quorum specifically to prevent a small number
of individuals from scuttling the ability of Congress to act.69 The larger
denominator, if constitutionally required, would have permitted states, or
factions within states, to delay the effectiveness of the Constitution and
the ability of the new government to function, contrary to the very
purpose of the Quorum Clause.
An unduly restrictive interpretation of the Quorum Clause creates
similar mischief in the wake of a massive attack against the Congress.0
The strongest argument for a denominator based on seats filled by
chosen, living, and sworn members comes from common sense-the
Federal Government should not allow itself to be paralyzed by a violent
assault directed against its officials and institutions. If the denominator
must include a large number of vacant seats not immediately filled
following a terrorist attack, that attack could prevent one or both houses
from attaining a quorum, in turn preventing Congress and the Federal
senators), THORPE, supra note 55, at 177 ("New York, obedient to the influence of [Anti-
Federalist Governor] Clinton, had refused to appoint electors .... ").
68. See THORPE, supra note 55, at 176 ("All through the winter of 1789, the
supporters of the Constitution were anxious lest in some way its enemies might yet cause
delay, or even overthrow the plan."); see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 17, at 6, 8
(discussing the need for states to select people to operate the machinery of government
during the winter of 1788-1789). The Framers explicitly avoided this problem with regard
to the Presidency by requiring that the President win only a majority of votes from
electors actually appointed. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. ("The Person having the
greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the
whole Number of Electors appointed .... ").
69. See THE FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 8, at 354 (James Madison) (explaining
that the quorum requirement was set at a majority so that the minority could not wield too
much power with regard to the legislature's ability to act); see also John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A
Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 487 n.14 (1995); see also Records of the Federal Convention,
in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 289-90 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) (quoting arguments from the Convention as to the best level for the legislative
quorum).
70. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 9-10 ("A strict
interpretation of the constitutional quorum requirement would mean that the House
would be unable to act for many months until sufficient vacancies were filled."); id. at 9
(stating that a quorum based on living members in filled seats would ensure that the
House could operate with a quorum even after a massive death toll).
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Government from functioning, not only in response to the attack itself
but also as to the continued needs of governance. To paraphrase Senator
Jonathan Bingham, speaking to the effect of southern secession on the
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, it is simply
inconceivable that the Constitution enables the planners of a large-scale
terrorist attack to interfere with its operations."
The argument against a smaller quorum focuses on the
unrepresentativeness of a small body wielding legislative power.7 ' A
rump Congress of 101 representatives or thirty-one senators may be
unrepresentative politically, geographically, and ideologically, possibly
lacking representatives from some states.73 It may be different from the
full Congress, with dramatic policy changes as a potential consequence.
The small size might raise doubts as to the broader democratic legitimacy
of its actions.74 There also is a risk that a small quorum could be carried
to the extreme. For example, if the House of Representatives had only
nine living members after an attack, the presence of five (all from, for
example, small Western States) would constitute a quorum to carry out
71. See Harrison, supra note 54, at 421 (discussing arguments by Senator Bingham
that southern ratification of the Civil War Amendments was unnecessary because "it is
simply inconceivable that the Constitution allows traitors so to interfere with its
operation").
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 56, supra note 8, at 342 (James Madison) (addressing
charges that the House of Representatives would "be too small to possess a due
knowledge of the interests of its constituents"); see also Wasserman, supra note 2, at 320
(describing constitutional opponents' "fear that a small legislative body is a poor
depositary of the public interest, lacking necessary knowledge of constituents' interests").
73. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("[EJach State shall have at Least one
Representative .... "); Wasserman, supra note 2, at 313 (emphasizing problems of having
long periods with a small House that may not include representation for all states).
74. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361, 404 (2004) (describing one cost of legislative absences as "the loss of
legitimacy said to result when the legislature proceeds without a full complement or even
majority participation"); see also THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF THE DISSENT OF THE
MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787),
reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES 247-48 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (objecting to the fact that, with only sixty-
five members and a quorum requirement of thirty-three, seventeen people could
determine the sense of the House of Representatives). On the other hand, we could
conceive of a catastrophic event after which the problem would not be that the rump
House is too small, but that the full House is too large. Imagine that terrorists release a
fatal plague or virus across the United States that kills a large percentage of the country's
population, akin to the effects of the Black Death in Europe in the Middle Ages. That
attack might reduce the population of the country so drastically as to require a reduction
in the size of the House, which cannot exceed one representative for every 30,000 people.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Representation is determined according to the results of a
decennial census, see id., so any adjustment in the House would not occur until the next
census. In the meantime, the skeletal House may, in fact, be more proportional to the
population.
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House business and a vote of three would be sufficient to enact
legislation.75
These potentially valid objections sound in policy (as opposed to
76constitutional) concerns. They do not rebut the conclusion that each
house possesses constitutional power to establish a quorum (particularly
for use in the emergencies considered here) based on a denominator of
elected, sworn, and living members. Permitting Congress to proceed in
rump fashion under a quorum of a majority of living members is the only
way to ensure immediate continuity in the hours and days following an
attack.
Several considerations mitigate the policy objections to the small
Congress. Under the Constitution of 1787, the House of Representatives
consisted of sixty-five members, with a census to be taken (and
representation adjusted accordingly) after three years.77 Opponents of
the Constitution argued that this House was too small and
unrepresentative, and that a small legislative body was a poor repository
of the public interest, lacking necessary knowledge of constituents'
interests. 78  But Madison recognized the necessity of occasional
departures from preferred selection processes to handle emergent
situations. He defended the small size as a necessary temporary
regulation, lasting only until more permanent (and structurally sound)
75. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 9.
76. See Harrison, supra note 54, at 378 n.11 ("Whether the houses should have acted
on any major questions, including a constitutional amendment, while a substantial part of
the country was unrepresented was a question of policy, not power."). To the extent
constitutional concerns remain with the small quorum, the adjusted language of Senator
Cornyn's amendment, granting Congress power to provide by law for mass vacancies
notwithstanding other limitations with regard to congressional rules or quorums, would be
sufficient to grant power to each house to establish an emergency small-quorum rule
applicable only in the immediate continuity stage following an attack on Congress. See
supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 8, at 339
(James Madison). The House that convened in April 1789 only had fifty-nine members;
North Carolina, which had five seats, and Rhode Island, which had one seat, had not yet
ratified the Constitution. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 320 n.170. James Madison's
stated expectation was that the House would grow to over 100 members following that
first census, to 200 after twenty-five years and to 400 after fifty years. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 8, at 339 (James Madison). But see SPEECHES OF
MELANCTON SMITH (1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 74, at 346 (arguing that there is no
guarantee that such increases will be made, because the issue is left to Congress itself).
78. See SPEECHES OF MELANCTON SMITH, supra note 77 ("[T]he number fixed in the
Constitution, is not sufficient without it is augmented."); cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 55,
supra note 8, at 340 (James Madison) ("[T]he liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the
number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, supra
note 8, at 342 (James Madison) (addressing charge that the House would "be too small to
possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents").
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regulations could be put in place.79 The small sizes of both houses (and
of their respective quorums) in the immediate continuity stage similarly
would be the temporary product of the extreme emergency, lasting only
until the next stage of the continuity process. So long as speedy
repopulation processes are in place,8" a few days of a small Congress
becomes less troubling.
Moreover, the checks of bicameralism and separation of powers
constrain the ability of one small house to abuse its ability to act. A
small House of Representatives (even one in which five members
constitute a quorum and three members can enact legislation) cannot
unilaterally do anything substantial unless a working Senate and a
President concur. The small-House-run-amok argument assumes an
unlikely partisan or ideological capture of all three political departments
and members acting on that capture. Such blatant partisan political
abuse of the process seems unlikely, especially in a time of national crisis.
Finally, each house could impose a minimum number of living
members below which a small quorum would not be possible. One
possible floor could be (for purely historical reasons) the sixty-five
representatives (quorum of thirty-three) or twenty-six senators (quorum
of fourteen) established in the original Constitution. Below those floors,
each house could not function until the second stage, interim
repopulation. This may strike an acceptable temporal balance between
needing a functioning Congress in the immediate aftermath of an attack
and not wanting an unacceptably small and unrepresentative Congress
wielding national legislative power."'
B. Repopulation
The need for more permanent and structurally sound selection
regulations moves the process quickly into the next stage, repopulation.
The point of repopulation is to fill the seats rendered vacant by the
deaths of large numbers of members in each house and to bring both
houses back to full working capacity." The risks associated with a small,
unrepresentative Congress wielding legislative power can be alleviated
primarily by ensuring that the immediate continuity stage (with Congress
79. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 8, at 339 (James Madison). The longer-
term regulation for the House would be the reapportionment after the first census and
every subsequent decennial census and the continued growth of the House along with the
growth of the country. See id.
80. See infra notes 82-114 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 178-87.
82. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 321 (arguing that the immediate continuity phase
is the product of the extreme emergency and should last only until vacancies can be filled
by the several states through immediate appointments and popular elections).
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operating in rump form) lasts only for a sharply limited time.
Repopulation then subdivides into two stages: interim repopulation and
final repopulation.
1. Repopulation: Interim and Final
Final repopulation is the end-game of the process, requiring that all
seats be filled and both houses be at full working capacity, with all
members chosen via the procedure ordinarily used to select members of
both houses of Congress-direct popular election via near-universal
adult suffrage. 3 One could argue that Congress has been repopulated
only if both houses are at full capacity with all or almost all members
having been popularly elected. At the same time, there is general
agreement that elections cannot take place within one week of an attack,
although disagreements exist as to how quickly elections could occur.
4
Assuming special elections realistically might be held within
approximately three or four months, there must be a bridge from
immediate continuity under the rump Congress to final repopulation by
popular election.
That bridge is interim repopulation, during which stage new members
are brought into both houses, not according to preferred selection
procedures, but through an expedited process. Each house gains the
expected number of members (435 in the House, 100 in the Senate) and
is at or close to full working speed, but some of those members are
selected in a different, potentially less democratic manner.
The model for two-stage repopulation is the Senate under the
Seventeenth Amendment. Senate vacancies are filled by statewide
election, but a state legislature may grant the governor the power to
make temporary appointments until an election can be held . Forty-
eight state legislatures have delegated power to make temporary
appointments, with appointees serving until a new senator is chosen at
83. See infra note 120.
84. See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text.
85. Clause 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment states:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in- the Senate, the
executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2.
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-9-7 (Supp. 2001) ("The governor may make temporary
appointment of a senator in the senate of the congress of the United States from Alabama
whenever a vacancy exists in that office, the appointee to hold office until his successor is
elected and qualified."); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (Deering 1995). Section 10720 states
that:
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the next scheduled statewide election or at a special election called by
the governor.i Senate appointments can be made almost immediately,
certainly within one week of the vacancy,"" bringing the Senate back to
full or near-full capacity and moving the process from immediate
continuity to interim repopulation. The election, whenever it occurs,
then moves the Senate to final repopulation.
The Senate model presently is inapplicable to the House of
Representatives, for which new election remains the only means of filling
89vacant seats. Under the current structure there is no interim
repopulation in the House, only final repopulation once an election is
held; the seat remains vacant in the meantime.
The most obvious solution is to apply the Senate model to the House.
I previously have argued for a constitutional amendment establishing
House appointments.91 This also was the central recommendation of the
Continuity of Government Commission in its report on continuity of
Congress,9' as well as the substance of numerous congressional proposals
after 9/11.92 The pending Senate plan amends the Constitution to make
If a vacancy occurs in the representation of this state in the Senate of the United
States, the Governor may appoint and commission an elector of this state who
possesses the qualifications for the office to fill the vacancy until his or her
successor is elected and qualifies and is admitted to his or her seat by the United
States Senate.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 100.161 (1997) ("[T]he Governor may make a temporary appointment
until the vacancy is filled by election."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.68.070 (2003)
("When a vacancy occurs in the representation of this state in the senate of the United
States, the governor shall make a temporary appointment to that office until the people fill
the vacancy by election ...... ).
87. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (Deering 1995) ("An election to fill a vacancy
in the term of a United States Senator shall be held at the general election next succeeding
the occurrence of the vacancy or at any special election."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321
(1999) ("[T]he Governor may make a temporary or ad interim appointment.., to fill such
vacancy until the same shall be filled at the next ensuing general election in the manner
prescribed by law."); see also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, app. V, at
37-43 (enumerating time requirements in all fifty states for holding a special election to fill
a House vacancy).
88. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 6 ("Senate vacancies are, in
practice, filled almost immediately by gubernatorial appointment.").
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4; see also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra
note 4, at 6 ("A special election is the only method for filling House vacancies.");
Wasserman, supra note 2, at 305 (stating that popular election is the exclusive method of
choosing House members and neither the states nor Congress can, under the current
Constitution, create new or additional mechanisms).
90. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 312.
91. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 14-15 (urging adoption of
the same procedure used by the Senate under the Seventeenth Amendment).
92. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 67, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 77, 107th Cong. (2001);
S.J. Res. 30, 107th Cong. (2001).
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House appointments permissible, then delegates to each state the power
to establish appropriate procedures to fill vacancies in its congressional
delegation, with one option being the Senate model of gubernatorial
appointments followed by expeditious special elections.9'
Application of the Senate model to the House raises the additional
issue of who should make appointments. Because senators originally
were selected by state legislatures and were perceived (as they are today)
as representing entire states,94 leaving temporary Senate appointments
with state government was not inconsistent with the newly populist
Senate. Governors and senators represent the same polyglot statewide
electoral constituencies,9 so the appointments likely would reflect the
popular will. Moreover, gubernatorial appointments to the House would
unify interim repopulation in Congress as a whole-the same state
official would fill all vacancies in that state's congressional delegation at
one time, better guaranteeing that seats would be filled quickly in the
wake of an attack.
But a governor's statewide electoral constituency may be significantly
different from the more local constituency of a House member from one
district within the state.96 This difference perhaps demands a different
appointing authority for House members. One suggested alternative is
to have each representative predesignate a successor for the interim
repopulation stage; that successor would assume the seat should the
elected member be killed in the attack and would serve until an election
and final repopulation can take place.9' The expected benefit of
93. See S.J. Res. 23, 108th Cong. (2003); Continuity of Congress Act of 2003, S. 1820,
108th Cong. § 2(a) (2003): see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
94. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1479, 1507 (1994) ("Senators represent states .....
95. See Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 749.
96. See Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 130 (discussing the "narrow, local strategies
by which Congressmen secure election in their states and districts, with promises of pork
and parks"); Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 748 ("The citizen within her House constituency
thus may identify herself and her political priorities primarily on the basis of local
concerns."); Wasserman, supra note 8, at 361 (stating that House members are elected by
the smallest constituency of voters); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 552 (1954) (emphasizing the localism and
separatism of the House).
97. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Brian
Baird), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&witid=2569 (arguing for a
constitutional amendment authorizing sitting House members to identify potential
designees who would temporarily assume the representative's duties until special elections
could be held); see also Thomas S. Foley & Newt Gingrich, If Congress Were Attacked,
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at B9. It will be necessary to amend the Constitution to grant
the House the power to establish the predesignation procedure by rule. See CONTINUITY
OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 21-22 (concluding that granting the power of
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predesignation is a successor who is ideologically, demographically, and
politically similar to the elected member and to the voters of that district.
A governor and representative also may be of different political parties,
so a unilateral gubernatorial appointment may bring about a change in
party control of the seat and, in a closely divided body with a number of
such appointments, a change in party control of the House itself.
Exclusive appointment by a representative is problematic from the
basic policy standpoint that it empowers an elected official unilaterally to
choose a contingent successor-a novel and democratically troubling
power. 99 Currently, the only federal official who selects a contingent
successor is the President, who, either in reality or in practical effect,
appoints her Vice President."" Importantly, however, that appointment
is not unilateral.'" This plan, by contrast, empowers a member of the
House to designate a contingent successor without any consideration of
that successor or her qualifications by the voters or anyone outside of the
member herself.' 2
The best solution is a combination of gubernatorial appointments and
predesignation: the House member provides the governor of her state
with an advance list of potential, constitutionally eligible successors and
the governor must choose from those on the list."'" Congress could speed
predesignation solely through House rule is unconstitutional); Wasserman, supra note 2, at
305 (arguing that selection of interim members by current members is not related to rules
of proceeding or operations, and thus a House rule authorizing each member to
predesignate a successor would not be permissible under the current Constitution).
98. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 23: Wasserman, supra note
2, at 313.
99. See Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, 145
PUB. PAPERS 129 (June 19, 1945) (arguing that officials in a democracy should not appoint
their own contingent successors).
100. The President appoints the Vice President in two situations: when she chooses a
running mate and when she appoints a new Vice President to fill a vacancy in that office
under the Twenty-fifth Amendment. See Wasserman, supra note 8, at 407-08.
101. A Vice Presidential appointee must be confirmed by both houses of Congress,
and a Vice Presidential candidate at least nominally stands before the national electorate
for consideration and approval as part of the Presidential candidate's ticket. See
Wasserman, supra note 2, at 313-14; Wasserman, supra note 8, at 407-08.
102. The House judges whether to seat an individual member. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 5, cl. 1. But the House is "without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his
constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the
Constitution." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969). Moreover, the
Constitution does not grant to the House the power to appoint a different, more
acceptable member to a seat if it rejects another's credentials or qualifications. See
Wasserman, supra note 2, at 305.
103. See CONTINUITY OF GOVT COMM'N, supra note 4, at 28-29. Other sources have
suggested a range of alternative appointing authorities, including the President, the
Supreme Court, state legislatures or committees of state legislatures, or the remainder of
Congress- all fail for reasons described at length by the Continuity of Government
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the emergency appointment process in both houses by requiring that all
appointments in the wake of mass destruction be made from a list of
contingent appointees for each seat prepared by that seatholder at the
beginning of every Congress."" Because the identity of the appointee
would be known before any emergency creates a vacancy, appointments
could be made more quickly once mass vacancies occur.
The list of potential appointees, as well as details of their backgrounds
and qualifications, also should be made public from the outset, adding a
degree of popular accountability to the appointment process.' 9 The
public might challenge a governor in advance if proposed appointees are
viewed as unqualified or unpopular or if the governor is seen as
attempting to work a dramatic shift in ideology or party affiliation of
Congress through her proposed contingent appointments to the state
congressional delegation. 116  The people also might influence the
identities of potential congressional appointees, aligning the designated
contingent appointee more with popular will long before the
appointment will be made (and before we even know if an appointment
would have to be made)."" Even if we expect little political
gamesmanship during a national crisis"'. the public and member
predesignation can check the attempt or inclination to take partisan or
Commission. See id. at 28. The only suggestion with some potential validity would be
selection by the full legislature of a state, which is how senators were chosen prior to the
Seventeenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. I (providing that senators shall
be chosen by the legislature of the state). Legislative appointments perhaps produce a
more democratically valid successor, because the range of interests and ideas reflected in
the legislature may produce a more broadly representative candidate than would
gubernatorial appointment. Ultimately, I agree with the commission that the need for a
speedy appointment weighs against the type of slow deliberativeness that would
characterize selection by a large body. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4,
at 28.
104. See H.R.J. Res. 83, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003); CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N,
supra note 4, at 28 (discussing gubernatorial appointments from a list drawn up in advance
by each house member); Wasserman, supra note 2, at 322 ("Congress could require each
governor to prepare an advance list of possible appointees for each seat in its
congressional delegation .... "); see also Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 9
(statement of Sanford Levinson), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1022
&wit id=2919 ("My own preference would be to have each member of Congress deposit
with the Governor a letter containing a short list of preferred successors, should the
occasion ever arise, with the Governor required to choose from that list.").
105. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 322.
106. See id. at 314 ("A Democratic governor who, in the wake of a terrorist attack,
appoints ten Democrats to replace an evenly split House delegation might pay a political
price.").
107. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29 (discussing the
legitimacy placed on appointees selected by governors from a list prepared by the
deceased members the appointees are to replace).
108. See id. at 23, 24.
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ideological advantage of a potential tragedy through temporary
appointments.
The uniquely populist nature of the House and the mass-destruction
scenario do compel changes in the process of gubernatorial
appointments, both to preserve the nature of the House and to ensure its
speedy repopulation. It is here that Congress plays a role in coordinating
and unifying the interim repopulation stage among the several states.
First, all appointments should be made within seven days, strictly limiting
the time in which either house functions in skeletal form and moving
quickly into repopulation.1' 9 Second, temporary House appointments
(unlike Senate appointments) should be limited only to the extreme
emergency of mass vacancies, but not a small number of vacancies in the
ordinary course. A drop from 435 to 430 House members does not
warrant appointments; only if some significant threshold of members
have been killed should appointments be made.""
Finally, Congress should limit the time an unelected appointee
occupies a congressional seat by speeding the move from interim
repopulation to final repopulation; this reinforces the democratic
legitimacy of Congress by filling every legislative seat with a duly elected
(as opposed to appointed) member as quickly as possible."'
Unfortunately, outside of the emergency, mass-destruction scenario,
states generally take too long to hold special elections. Senate
109. See H.R.J. Res. 67, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing a constitutional amendment
requiring appointments "as soon as practicable (but in no event later than 7 days) after the
member's death or incapacity has been certified"); S.J. Res. 30, 107th Cong. (2001)
(proposing constitutional amendment containing similar requirement); see also
Wasserman, supra note 2, at 322 (suggesting that Congress demand that each state provide
for temporary appointments within seven to fourteen days).
110. The proposed constitutional amendments authorizing House appointments all
have included a high threshold number of seats that must be vacant (or occupied by
incapacitated members) in order for the appointment power to take hold. See, e.g., SJ.
Res. 23, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing a constitutional amendment empowering Congress
to provide by law for the naming of temporary House members whenever one-fourth or
more of the seats are vacant); H.R.J. Res. 83, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (proposing
amendment allowing for appointments when a "majority of the whole membership of the
House of Representatives are unable to carry out their duties"); S.J. Res. 30, 107th Cong.
(2001) (proposing a constitutional amendment authorizing House appointments whenever
fifty percent of House members are unable to carry out their duties); H.R.J. Res. 77, 107th
Cong. (2001) (proposing a constitutional amendment empowering Congress to provide by
law for the appointment of temporary members whenever thirty percent or more of the
seats are vacant); H.R.J. Res. 67 (proposing a constitutional amendment authorizing
House appointments whenever "25 percent or more of the members of the House of
Representatives are unable to carry out their duties because of death or incapacity"); see
also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 27 (discussing the need for a high
threshold in order to trigger an emergency temporary appointments).
11. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 319.
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appointees tend to serve until the next regularly scheduled statewide
election."' As for the House, from the Ninety-ninth through the 107th
Congress, it took an average of 126 days to hold elections, with seventy-
four days being the shortest time between vacancy and election. "3 Such
delays are intolerable when 334 House seats are vacant simultaneously or
are filled by appointees. Thus, Congress must require that each state
hold special congressional elections in an expedited manner, within three
or four months of the attack and the resultant mass vacancies.'
4
2. Objections to the Senate Model as Applied to the House
The explicit call in June 2003 by the Continuity of Government
Commission for a constitutional amendment applying the Senate model
of temporary appointments and special elections to the House was met
with immediate heated opposition, particularly from members of the
House itself. They suggested that having appointed, rather than
popularly elected, members in the House, even for a defined short
period, destroys the fundamental democratic character of the House and
112. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (Deering 1995) ("An election to fill a vacancy
in the term of a United States Senator shall be held at the general election next succeeding
the occurrence of the vacancy .... ); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (1999) (providing for
appointees to serve until the seat "shall be filled at the next ensuing general election in the
manner prescribed by law").
113. See CONTINUITY OF GOv'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 7, app. IV, at 36:
Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Norman J. Ornstein),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2565; id. (statement of Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch), http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfm?id=909&wit-id=51.
114. See S.J. Res. 23 (proposing a constitutional amendment providing that any
procedure established for filling vacancies expire no later than 120 days after the vacancy,
with a possible extension); H.R.J. Res. 67 (proposing a constitutional amendment
requiring special election within ninety days of the appointment of a temporary House
member); S.J. Res. 30 (proposing constitutional amendment requiring special election
within a ninety-day period following the vacancy); see also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T
COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29 (suggesting that the special election be held within 120 days
of the vacancy). I previously have argued that special congressional elections should be
held within six months, in part because a special Presidential election also should be held
within six months whenever a double vacancy places a § 19 statutory successor in the
White House. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 317-19; Wasserman, supra note 8, at 410-
11. If fifty states are going to hold popular elections for President (or more precisely for
Presidential electors) within six months of an attack on the Government, new members of
Congress should be selected at the same time, rather than requiring states to conduct two
sets of elections in the wake of a national catastrophe. The difference between the interim
repopulation stage in Congress lasting four months and six months is insignificant, so long
as Congress is functioning at full capacity with appointed members during that time. One
response to this concern would be for Congress to provide that the timing of special
congressional elections is contingent on whether the same attack also created an executive
double vacancy-elections will be held within six months if a § 19 Presidential election
must take place, otherwise within four months.
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the right of the people to select the members of that body.'1 At the heart
of these objections is the belief in a "People's House"; members are
chosen by the people via direct election and only may be chosen by the
people, even if that means no functioning House (or Congress) until
those elections can take place.
' 6
These arguments all cite the Framers' desire to hold the House, as
distinct from the Senate, as a unique body subject exclusively to selection
by the people."' It is true that the original constitutional design sought a
sharp line between the People's House and the States' Senate."8 But that
115. H.R. REP. No. 108-404, pt. II, at 3 (2004) ("The House is rooted in democratic
principles, and those principles must be preserved."); see Congressional Continuity
Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. David Dreier). http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=909&witjid=2568 ("[W]e want to preserve our distinct quality of being
sent as elected representatives of the people."); id. ("[T]he Framers intended that such
important decisions should be made in the House not by someone who is selected for the
people, but by someone who is elected by the people."); id. (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy), http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfm?id=909&witid50 ("More than
any other Federal body, the House of Representatives reflects the Founders' belief that
the people should choose their leaders, and that those leaders should be directly
accountable to the people."); see also Press Release, Representative F. James
Sensenbrenner, Sensenbrenner Statement upon Introduction of "Continuity of
Representation Act" (July 24, 2003), http://www.house.gov/judiciary/news072403.htm
("Such an amendment would destroy the uninterrupted tradition that only Members duly
elected by their local constituents should serve in the House. Even worse, such an
amendment would take away the people's right to choose representation.").
116. See H.R. No. 108-404, pt. II, at 3 ("[T]he very adoption of such an amendment
itself would strike a fatal blow to what has otherwise always been 'The People's House."');
Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. David Dreier),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&witid=2568 ("[A]s the 'Peoples'
House,' we have never contemplated appointment .... ); id. (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy), http://judiciary.senate.gov/member statement.cfm?id=909&witid5O (describing
concern that appointing members "would involve a fundamental departure from our
constitutional heritage"); see also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 22
("The House of Representatives is rightly called the 'people's house,' as it is the
representative body closest to the people with elections held every two years.").
117. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-404, pt. I, at 3 ("James Madison used the strongest of
terms when stating the House must be composed only of those elected by the People.");
Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. David Dreier),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfmid=909&witid=2568 ("The Framers of the
Constitution ... wisely created a House and Senate with differing size, constituency, term
of office, procedural rules, duties, and prerogatives."); see also Sensenbrenner, supra note
115 ("James Madison used the strongest terms when stating the House must be composed
only of those elected by the people. . . . Far from envisioning a system in which state
governors appointed those who would serve in the House, Madison wrote that 't]he
electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States."').
118. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 8, at 229 (James Madison) ("The House
of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all State Legislatures, is elected
immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate . . .derives its appointment
indirectly from the people."); id. at 212 ("The House of Representatives will derive its
powers from the people of America .... The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its
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clear line blurred with the Seventeenth Amendment, ", which instilled
the same method of selection for both houses: direct popular election via
near-universal adult suffrage.' 2" Each house retains certain distinct
characteristics, as their members serve for different periods of time and
represent distinct constituencies and concerns.' 2' The House remains the
more populist and representative; individual members are elected by a
smaller, localized pool of voters, stand for consideration before the
voters more frequently, and deal with more local concerns and issues.,
22
Senators, even if popularly elected, stand before the voters less
frequently and still represent a broader, more diverse constituency.1
23
The Senate also remains the only legislative body in the United States at
powers from the States as political and coequal societies ... "); see also Vikram David
Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth
Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1352 (1996) ("[Tlhe Framers and ratifiers of the
original Constitution chose legislative election largely to safeguard the existence and
interests of the state governments. Indeed, the legislative election device was explicitly
linked to the famous Madisonian compromise by which the States were given equal
suffrage in the Senate."); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and
the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment. 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 509 (1997) ("[T]he
Senate should counter the democratic excesses of the people, newly represented in the
House of Representatives.").
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. cl. 1: Amar, supra note 118, at 1352-55 (tracing the
history of the move to direct election of senators): Bybee, supra note 118, at 536-47
(same).
120. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("[T]he Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature."); id. amend. XVII, cl. 1 ("The electors in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state
legislatures."); see also Abner J. Mikva. Doubting Our Claims to Democracy, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 793, 798 (1997) ("[W]e have come as close to universal suffrage as any country in
world history."); Wasserman, supra note 8, at 393 & n.200 (arguing that several
constitutional amendments have expanded the electorate to more than seventy-five
percent of the population).
121. See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 481, 513 (1997) ("House districts are usually less populous than states, [and]
House elections [are] more frequent than those for the Senate ...."); Bybee, supra note
118, at 546 ("At some theoretical level senators had always represented the people, so that
the change to direct election was no change in constituency."): Steven G. Calabresi & Joan
L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?. 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1093 (1994) ("The Framers' constitutional system as it works
today creates three different and independent electoral constituencies: the President's
(and Vice President's) national constituency, each Senator's constituency of one state, and
each Representative's constituency of one of the 435 congressional districts.");
Wasserman, supra note 8, at 377 (arguing that the House and Senate "remain distinct
departments chosen by distinct electoral constituencies ... different voices of the People
speaking through ... different channels").
122. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
123. See Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 749 ("[A] Senate constituency may take on the
more polygot character of the state as a whole.").
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any level of government in which representation is not allocated
according to population.1
24
But differences between the two houses no longer are grounded in
manner of selection;'2 5 the two houses no longer are filled differently, at
least in the ordinary course. If temporary gubernatorial appointments do
not offend the (newly) democratic nature of the Senate, there is no
reason a similar procedure should offend the democratic nature of the
House in emergency situations. To the extent meaningful differences
between the houses remain, we may accommodate them by adjusting the
rules and scope of emergency House appointments as compared to
Senate appointments.'
Moreover, opponents of applying the Senate model of two-stage
repopulation in the House take the views of the Framers out of context.
For example, Representative James Sensenbrenner cited James Madison
as arguing that elections are the only way to ensure that the House has
an intimate sympathy with and dependence on the people."' In fact,
Madison spoke of frequent elections as the necessary policy, not elections-- • 28
themselves. No one is suggesting that representatives should not be
124. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (holding that state legislative
bodies must be apportioned according to population). The Court rejected, as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, a state legislative apportionment plan under which each
county was given one representative in one house of the State legislature, regardless of
population in the county. Id. at 575. This holding forced the Court to explain why the
U.S. Senate alone could deviate from that pattern. See Bennett, supra note 121, at 485.
The Court explained it as follows:
The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress is one
ingrained in our Constitution, as part of the law of the land. It is one conceived
out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our
federal republic. Arising from unique historical circumstances, it is based on the
consideration that in establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly
independent States bound themselves together under one national government.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574; id. at 573 ("[T]he Founding Fathers clearly had no intention of
establishing a pattern or model for the apportionment of seats in state legislatures when
the system of representation in the Federal Congress was adopted."). Compare Bennett,
supra note 121, at 500 (arguing that the Senate model generally is accepted), with Robin
West, Tom Paine's Constitution, 89 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1446 (2003) ("Why is there not, for
example, an urban-based movement to eradicate the heightened representation of
sparsely populated parts of the country occasioned by our bicameral system of unequal
representation?").
125. See Bybee, supra note 118, at 546-47 (arguing that the change in mode or manner
for choosing senators meant that the states would be represented only as territorial
entities in which people resided, rather than as political entities).
126. See supra notes 103-44.
127. See Sensenbrenner, supra note 115 ("Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers that
elections are 'unquestionably the only policy' by which the House can have 'an intimate
sympathy with the people."').
128. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, supra note 8, at 321 (James Madison).
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chosen by popular vote or that House elections should be held any less
frequently than the two years established in Article I. In fact,
proponents of temporary appointments recognize the need for an
additional, expedited election within a few months of any appointment,
perhaps long before the next scheduled biennial election.29
Critics also have quoted Alexander Hamilton for the proposition that
"direct election by the people, and NOT selection ... is the only way to
ensure a national government. ' ' 3" This again takes the point out of
context. Hamilton argued that the security of the National Government
demanded that House elections be subject to regulation by the National
Government itself, as opposed to being left exclusively to the states,
where elections could be held up by state or local inaction.13 ' Hamilton
was concerned that states (or factions within states) "could at any
moment annihilate [the National Government] by neglecting to provide
for the choice of persons to administer its affairs.' ' 32 This has nothing to
do with an absolute requirement that elections be held, only with who
controls the time, place, and manner of holding those elections.
In reality, the insistence that the Framers did not want House
appointments is a non sequitur in the debate. The question is whether
the current generation should amend the Constitution to establish its
own structural preferences, which often entails major changes to the
overarching governmental system.13' A key purpose of Article V is to
enable the system to respond to situations where experience reveals that
existing procedures do not operate effectively or properly in light of
developments and circumstances that the Framers did not or could not
129. See Continuity of Congress Act of 2003, S. 1820, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2003) ("In
the case of vacancy ... the executive authority of the relevant State shall issue writs of
election, which shall be held not later than 120 days after any such vacancy occurs."); see
also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29 ("[T]he appointment should last
until the special election is held to fill the seat, but ... the special election shall be held
within 120 days of the vacancy."), Wasserman, supra note 2, at 319-20.
130. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. David
Dreier) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton)), http://judiciary.senate.
gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&witid=2568.
131. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 8, at 363-64 (Alexander Hamilton)
("[Tihere is intended to be a general election of members once in two years. If the State
Legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating these elections,
every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the national situation .....
132. Id. at 360.
133. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure
Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1996) (arguing that some
constitutional amendments "worked significant structural changes in the original
constitutional framework").
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
foresee.' 4 Structural preferences also change over time, whether because
the current generation prefers one structural principle to another or
because the current generation recognizes that a different procedure
better serves a given principle."' The Framers likely never envisioned a
single attack or series of coordinated attacks that could kill or
incapacitate a large portion of the House or a single event that could
deprive Congress of a quorum. Whether the response to this
unanticipated contingency should entail a temporary change in the mode
or manner of selecting the House, and even a temporary change in the
nature of the House, is a judgment for the current Nation to make and
instill in the basic charter. 36 The Framers' views are noteworthy, but do
nothing to dispel the merits of the argument for that change.
Finally, no one is suggesting that the House should become an
appointed, unelected body, even in the short term. The question is only
how to handle the interim period of three, four, or six months between
immediate continuity and the popular elections that establish final
repopulation. Surprisingly, opponents of the Senate model insist that
"every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own
preservation,"'' 7 but they oppose the clearest means of preserving the
House of Representatives. 138
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 8. at 268 (James Madison) ("That useful
alterations will be suggested by experience could not but be foreseen."); see also THOMAS
PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN PART THE SECOND: COMBINING PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
(1792), reprinted in COLLECTED WRITINGS 594 (Eric Foner ed., 1995) ("One of the
greatest improvements that has been made for the perpetual security and progress of
constitutional liberty, is the provision which the new constitutions make for occasionally
revising, altering, and amending them."); cf Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra
note 9 (statement of Sanford Levinson), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?
id=1022&wit-id=2919 ("Fortunately, when inevitable imperfections do manifest
themselves, 'there is a Constitutional door open."') (quoting George Washington).
135. See Wasserman, supra note 8, at 351 ("The creation and application of a selection
procedure reflects a choice or emphasis on some principle or principles over others.
Choices as to which principle to emphasize can and will change over time, and a change in
emphasis will require and produce a different or amended selection method."); id. ("Every
selection decision can and should be examined ... to determine ... whether a different
selection procedure would better serve the desired principles.").
136. See West, supra note 124, at 1421 (describing Thomas Paine's view that the
Constitution "should be kept current through a process of continual, popular
reformulation, revision, redrafting, and amending").
137. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 8, at 359-60 (Alexander Hamilton).
138. Rep. Baird testified that:
Ironically, those who insist that nothing other than a House comprised of directly
elected members, would, by their insistence, likely leave the entire nation to be
governed either by a handful of survivors, who in fact were elected by only a
small fraction of the population, or by people who were not elected at all.
Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Representative Brian
Baird), http:/ljudiciary.senate.govltestimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2569.
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3. The Need for Interim Repopulation
James Madison defended the small size of the House of
Representatives in the First Congress as a temporary regulation that was
necessary and intended to last only until a more permanent and
structurally sound system could be established.'39 The same can be said
for temporary House appointments-they would be a temporary
solution, intended to last only until final repopulation via popular
election. 4" There is general agreement that expedited House (as well as
Senate) elections would be necessary to fill the large number of seats
rendered vacant.' 4' And the democratic legitimacy of Congress demands
that both houses be filled to capacity by popularly elected members as
quickly as possible. 142
The disagreement lies in how quickly those elections can or should
occur. In direct response to the Continuity of Government
Commission's call for a constitutional amendment importing the Senate
model into the House, the House passed the Continuity of
139. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 8, at 339-40 (James Madison); supra
notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
140. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Brian
Baird), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&witid=2569 (arguing for a
constitutional amendment "to provide for a more orderly and expeditious means of
temporarily, and I underscore temporarily replacing House members until special
elections can be held").
141. See CONTINUITY OF GOV7T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29 ("[T]he appointment
should last until the special election is held to fill the seat, but ... the special election shall
be held within 120 days of the vacancy."); Wasserman, supra note 2, at 319-20 (arguing for
special Senate, and perhaps House, elections within six months); see also S.J. Res. 23,
108th Cong. (2003) (proposing a constitutional amendment empowering Congress to
address mass vacancies, but requiring that any procedures established would expire within
120 days of the mass vacancies); Continuity of Congress Act of 2003, S. 1820, 108th Cong.
§ 2(a)(4) (2003) (providing that any special election must occur within 120 days). The
insistence that the House be popularly elected demands speedy special elections. But I
have suggested previously that House elections may be less necessary, given that the
House seat would be contested in a regular election within a relatively short period.
Wasserman, supra note 2, at 319. Consider the following: A mass terrorist attack occurs
six months into a new Congress: the appointees take their seats within one week and the
special election occurs six months later. The newly elected member would take her seat
with less than one year remaining on the two-year term, which would be contested in a
new, regular biennial election later that year. Without denigrating the import of the
people's House, one might question whether a special election is worth the time, effort,
and cost simply to have a popularly elected member in the seat for eleven months, with a
regular election on the horizon. However, given the institutional intensity of the demand
for House elections, see supra notes 115-38 and accompanying text, I am willing to accept
that special elections must follow soon after a large number of House appointments.
142. See CONTINUITY OF GOVT COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29 (stressing "the
importance of placing an elected member in the seat with dispatch"); Wasserman. supra
note 2, at 319 ("[D]emocracy demands a duly elected legislator in office as quickly as
possible.").
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Representation Act of 2003.143 The version of the bill that passed the
House requires that in the event of vacancies in 100 or more House seats,
states hold elections within forty-five days, with parties making
nominations within ten days. 44 In the meantime, of course, the House
either is unable to function or operates in unrepresentative rump form.
In the framework of our three-stage process, the bill extends immediate
continuity from one week to approximately six weeks. It skips interim
repopulation and moves directly from immediate continuity to final
repopulation through rushed elections. The plan does have the benefit
of establishment via ordinary legislation, rather than constitutional
amendment; Congress already possesses power to regulate the time,
place, and manner of holding elections for the House and Senate.141 It
obviously is preferable to establish emergency procedures through the
ordinary legislative process, rather than through the more difficult and
time-consuming constitutional amendment process.
Whether we can pretermit interim repopulation, as the bill proposes,
turns on how quickly elections can take place in the real world. The
elections must occur quickly enough to limit sufficiently the length of
time in which the House functions only under a small quorum. The
question is whether a substantial number (at least 100 under the House
bill, 334 under our scenario) of simultaneous congressional elections
could be held nationwide less than two months after a 9/11-style attack
directed at Congress and the National Government or less than two
months after the release of anthrax in the ventilation system of
congressional offices.
Two concerns suggest that such a large number of elections could not
be carried out under these circumstances. First, there is the procedural
143. H.R. 2844, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill passed the House in April 2004 on a 306-
97 vote. H.R. REP. No. 108-503, at 6 (2004).
144. The original bill called for elections within twenty-one days of the attack, with
parties having fourteen days to nominate candidates and seven days to conduct the
general election. See H.R. 2844 § 2(b). The bill underwent review in the Committee on
the Judiciary after having been marked up and reported out by the Committee on House
Administration. H.R. REP. No. 108-404, pt. II, at 10 (2004). The longer time frames likely
were in response to committee testimony from election law experts suggesting that forty-
five days was the minimum necessary to conduct an election. See Congressional
Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of R. Doug Lewis), http://judiciary.senate.
gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit id=2566.
145. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. David
Dreier), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&witid=2568 ("This approach..
• would allow Americans to 'retain their local voice in Washington ... without changing
the Constitution."') (quoting House Speaker Dennis Hastert); see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations .... ").
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problem of whether the several states can execute elections in such an
extremely expedited manner. Election law experts suggest that sixty
days is the minimum period for holding valid elections. 46 Problems that
affect the timing and the ability of states to expedite elections include
cost, 47 whether to hold primary elections or whether parties should
choose nominees by other means,' 4' how to allow time for the process of
filing and qualifying candidates at the front end, 49 and the counting and
certifying of votes and certification of a winner at the back end." There
are also the basic mechanics of securing polling places, hiring election
workers, designing and printing ballots, and so on, all of which would
become more difficult absent advance notice of the election. ' As one
election law expert put it, Congress must be careful not to insist on
expedited elections "in such a way to place the process in an overly risky,
overly ambitious timetable which courts an additional disaster."' '52 It is
not feasible to execute so many elections within a three-week period,
particularly without warning in the wake of a 9/11-type attack.
53
146. R. Doug Lewis testified that:
[E]very day you can grant that gets us closer to 60 days increases the likelihood
that the election will mean more to the candidates and the voters and allow us to
build in the kinds of quality assurance and integrity processes that have been the
hallmark of elections in America.
Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of R. Doug Lewis).
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2566; id. (statement of Norman
J. Ornstein), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2565 ("[T]here is
no way to hold democratic special elections in less than two months under normal
circumstances and in the aftermath of an attack, it would be hard to imagine holding such
elections within three months."): CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 19
(estimating that after a catastrophic attack, with large numbers of special elections
occurring simultaneously, "even the most expedited elections would take a minimum of
three months").
147. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Thad Hall),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2567 ("For short-notice special
elections to be conducted successfully, the federal government should be willing to pay for
these elections so that localities have the money they need to do the job right."); id.
(statement of R. Doug Lewis), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=
909&wit-id=2566 (noting that it may not be valid to assume that cost can be ignored
during a true national emergency).
148. See id. (statement of Thad Hall), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=909&wit id-2567.
149. See id. (statement of R. Doug Lewis), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=909&witid=2566.
150. See id.
151. See id. (statement of Norman J. Ornstein), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=909&witid=2565.
152. Id. (statement of R. Doug Lewis), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=909&witid=2566.
153. In addition, consider that not every seat will become vacant simultaneously.
Suppose a member is severely injured in an attack, but does not pass away from her
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Advocates for speedy elections insist that "millions of people around
the country might fill schools and gymnasiums, churches and meeting
halls, and freely exercise, in the wake of a vicious attack by haters of
democracy and freedom, their right to chosen representation-a right
that has survived uninterrupted throughout the history of the United
States.",154 This misses the point. No one doubts that the people would
turn out to exercise the franchise. The problem is the inability of the
states realistically to operate the electoral mechanism effectively so that
the people are able to exercise the franchise.
The second, substantive, problem with ultraexpedited elections turns
on a theoretical question:
What is an election? Is it a date-certain event so that voters can
vote, or is it more than that? Is an election in American
democracy really a "process" that includes time for the
identification of candidates, the ability of candidates to mount a
campaign, to raise funds, to attract supporters, to inform the
voters of what their choices are between individual contestants,
and then going to the polls to make that choice? The point is
that if it is only an event, then we can structure an event in a
short time-frame and carry off the event as flawlessly as
possible. If, however, you define it in the broader "rocess"
terms, then you have to allow the process time to work.'--
The answer, Robert Bennett argues, is that "it is not the vote cast for
an official, but the conversation instigated by the prospect of elections
that matters to members of the citizenry."''1 6 Under Bennett's conception
of "democracy as a meaningful conversation," the act of voting is
important primarily as one part of the conversation.' But the act of
voting, if divorced from the other elements of a "meaningful
conversation," ceases to be a vital democratic act.
Andrei Marmor similarly suggests that a legitimate democratic
decision-making process consists of two stages: deliberation and
injuries until two weeks later. Must the state hold the election for that seat at the same
time as the seats that became vacant immediately in the attack? Or will that state have the
full forty-five days from the member's death to conduct the election for the newly vacant
seat? If the latter, then states will be conducting seriatim expedited elections, an even
more difficult task and an even greater drain on time and resources. If the former, then
the election time tables will be shorter for some seats than for others.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 108-404, pt. II, at 5 (2004).
155. Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of R. Doug Lewis),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2566.
156. Bennett, supra note 121, at 512.
157. See id. at 503.
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decision.'" During the deliberative stage, "people attempt to influence
the result in various ways, by proposing rational (or irrational)
arguments, bargains, enticements, and what not."'5 9 The deliberative
stage includes voters getting to know candidates, candidates informing
the voters of their qualifications and plans, and candidates and voters
trying to convince one another to vote in a certain way." The decision
stage is the actual casting of the vote and it is authoritative only if it
follows a broader deliberative process.161
The franchise is meaningful only as the stimulus for, and an ongoing
part of, the conversation among the people and between the people and
candidates; on this understanding, the quintessential act of self-
government is the conversation or discussion, not the decisional casting
of the vote alone. 62 To hold a substantial number of elections within
twenty-one, forty-five, or even sixty days of a 9/11-style tragedy is to
compel the people to cast votes without the benefit of the conversation,
deliberation, and discussion that gives the ballot its meaning. It is
decision without deliberation, which does not produce legitimate or
authoritative democratic outcomes.
The expedited-election plan also necessarily assumes that we are
locked into a two-party political system and that voters will cast ballots
158. See Andrei Marmor, Authority, Equality and Democracy 18 (2003) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=424612.
159. Id.
160. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of R. Doug
Lewis), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2566 ("Somewhere in
here has to be time for voters to find out who is officially on the ballot and to discover
information about them."); see also Bennett, supra note 121, at 508 (arguing that the
democratic conversation involves a simple two-way exchange between candidates or
elected officials and voters, as well as a broader give-and-take among members of the
public); Marmor, supra note 158, at 18 ("A considerable aspect of political power is
determined by people's ability to influence this process of deliberation."); cf
Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Norman J. Ornstein),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfmid=909&wit-id=2565 ("[S]uch elections could be
mere coronations for the rich and famous, who would run without voters knowing much at
all about them-and nothing about alternatives to them.").
161. See Marmor, supra note 158, at 18; see also Bennett, supra note 121. at 503
("There does not seem to me to be any plausible explanation for the democratic
conversation, including the time and energy devoted to persuasiveness in it, save that
periodic, genuinely contested elections make the conversation matter.").
162. Bennett argues that:
[I]f voting is not the quintessential act of self-government, but rather a pivotal
stimulus for, and a part of, an ongoing conversation ... then it is more natural to
think of individuals as valuing voting as part of what gives meaning to a sustained
activity that is a component of their everyday lives, of their senses of self.
Bennett, supra note 121, at 522-23.
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strictly along party lines. The original version of the Continuity of
Representation Act allotted twice as much time (fourteen days) for the
parties to nominate candidates as it did for the voters to get to know
those candidates once nominated (seven days) 64 The assumption must
be that it does not really matter who the candidates are or what they say
or whether the voters get to know them; once each major party chooses
its standard-bearer in a congressional district, citizens will vote the party
label.165 It further assumes that most House seats are party-safe; the
people will vote for the same party as in the most recent regular election,
and the seat will remain in the same party hands, even if the seat-holder
has changed.16
The standard view is that voters base their choices on the personal
qualities of candidates with whom they have some familiarity, but follow
straight party lines when no other information about candidates is
163. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) ("[T]he
States' interest permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice,
favor the traditional two-party system .... "); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45
(1986) ("There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party
system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government.");
Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593, 620
(2002) ("It is well established that single-member territorial districting with first-past-the-
post winners almost invariably leads to two and only two serious political parties.").
164. See supra note 144.
165. Ironically, while the Act assumes party-line voting, it simultaneously deprives
voters of the right to influence party nominations, because a three-to-six-week election
cycle almost certainly would force states to dispense with party primaries and nominate in
some other manner. See Congressional Continuity Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of
Norman J. Ornstein), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&witid=2565
("While it is perfectly legitimate for a state to bypass the primary system, do we want to
mandate that no state would be allowed to have party primaries in selecting candidates for
a special election?"); see also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 19.
Eliminating all popular influence in the primary further removes meaningfulness and
authoritativeness from the popular vote in the special House election. Cf United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941) ("Where the state law has made the primary an integral
part of the procedure of choice,.... the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the
primary is likewise included in the right protected .... ); see also Nathaniel Persily, In
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
Protecting Gerrymanders, t16 HARV. L. REV. 649, 661 (2002) (arguing that even if there is
a loss of competition in general elections, primary elections remain competitive and allow
for meaningful popular influence).
166. See Issacharoff, supra note 163, at 643 ("Not every district could have a roughly
equal number of registered Democrats and Republicans, and even a purely unmanipulated
process would create some safe districts. The distortion comes not from the fact that some
districts are safe, but from the fact that some districts are deliberately made
noncompetitive .... "); Persily, supra note 165, at 661 (describing the argument that
bipartisan gerrymanders create safe seats for one or the other party, irrespective of the
particular representative who might benefit).
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available. 6  The short time frame in the Act makes it impossible for
voters to obtain and deliberate on that information, necessitating more
party-line voting. Party-line voting may, in fact, be the way a special
election would work in practice.6 8 That does not mean we should
instantiate it in the very design of the special election process.
The longer it takes to hold a truly deliberative and conversational
election, the greater the distinction between interim and final
repopulation becomes and the greater the import of the former. Once
we recognize that final repopulation demands substantively meaningful
popular elections which cannot occur in such a short period of time, we
are left with a choice: extend immediate continuity by extending the
tenure of the small, unrepresentative rump House or allow for an interim
repopulation stage through short-term appointments that create a fully
representative House until authoritative deliberative elections can be
held. The latter better serves principles of democracy and the ideal of
having a House of Representatives that is substantial in size and
nationally representative in character.
III. MASS INCAPACITATIONS
A distinct procedural problem arises if the terrorist attack causes not
mass deaths, but mass incapacitations-a large number of sworn
members of both houses of Congress are alive, but physically unable to
perform their duties. Many may be in the hospital suffering from severe
burns or from radiation poisoning from a dirty bomb or from the effects
of inhaled or cutaneous anthrax or ricin. The Constitution treats the
House and Senate the same with regard to mass incapacitations: it makes
no arrangements for such a condition.
6 9
167. Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 196-97 (1993); see
also Nancy L. Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares: Political Parties and Civil Society, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 493, 505 (2000) ("[V]oting entails an expression of association in the sense
that the extent of electoral participation is influenced by campaign and party activities to
mobilize voters who respond to candidates, programs, and organizational efforts.").
168. See Calabresi, supra note 94, at 1528 (describing benefits to candidates from
association with a particular party and well-known members of that party); Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEx. L.
REV. 1741, 1761 (1993) ("IT]he Democrats and Republicans have always been associated
with at least a loose clustering of ideological and policy views."); Wasserman, supra note 8,
at 376 ("Parties do serve as rough proxies for ideology, or at least for a commitment to
some common set of public policies and positions and loose combination of ideological
and policy views.").
169. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 12 (identifying three ways
in which mass incapacitation is worse than mass death, notably the fact that both the
House and Senate lack procedures to deal with it).
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Expand on our post-attack scenario. The House of Representatives
has 101 surviving, uninjured members; of the remaining 334, suppose that
100 are dead and 234 are alive but physically unable to perform their
legislative functions. Similarly, in the Senate with thirty-one uninjured
members, twenty-five of the remaining senators are dead and forty-four
incapacitated.
Mass incapacitations create two problems. First, there can be no
immediate continuity. Disabled members must count in the quorum
denominator; they remain members duly chosen, sworn, and living,
whose membership would not have been terminated by resignation or by
action of one house of Congress. The apparent denominator under the
House quorum rule in our scenario remains 335, including the 101
uninjured members and the 234 incapacitated members and excluding
only the 100 dead members. A majority of 168 is necessary for a
quorum, unattainable because only 101 members are able to attend.
Similarly, the quorum denominator in the Senate is seventy-five, thirty-
one uninjured and forty-four alive but incapacitated, and a majority of
thirty-eight is unattainable.
Second, congressional seats cannot be repopulated, either interim or
final, when they are not vacant. The constitutional triggering language
for repopulation is "when vacancies happen; 7 0 absent a vacancy, the
power of the state to fill a seat in either house, whether by appointment
or special election, never attaches. The inability of either house to
function when a significant number of members are incapacitated
continues until one of several events occurs. First, enough incapacitated
members recover and return to Congress to allow for a quorum under
the existing rule. 17 Second, the congressional term ends, in which case a
(presumably) new member will be elected to that seat and sworn. Third,
712
incapacitated members die or resign, in which case the seats are
rendered vacant (they no longer count in the quorum denominator of
members chosen, sworn, and living) and could be filled according to the
two-step procedure already described. Fourth, Congress could speed the
creation of vacancies in those seats by expelling incapacitated members,
which each house can do for any reason on a two-thirds supermajority
vote.17  In the meantime, of course, the Nation has been without a
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 ("When vacancies happen in the Representation from
any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
Vacancies."); id. amend. XVII, cl. 2 ("When vacancies happen in the representation of any
State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill
such vacancies ....").
171. See supra notes 45-79 and accompanying text.
172. Cf CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 12.
173. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506-07
(1969). Expulsion cannot be an acceptable option. At the most basic level, if
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functioning government because one or both houses of Congress have
been unable to attain a quorum.
Mass incapacitations may constitute the real threat to the continuity of
Congress, because they have not been considered or addressed in
existing rules and procedures. The problem demands creativity. The
greatest weakness in the Continuity of Representation Act may be its
complete failure to address mass incapacitations in the House, as it
addresses only vacancies and elections to fill those vacancies.
174
Supporters of the bill appear content to live with a small House or no
House until final repopulation, even at the risk of reliance on a unilateral
dictatorship of the executive.
The common solution has been to handle incapacitated seats as a
subset of vacant seats in both the House and the Senate. Both mass
incapacitations and mass vacancies provide grounds for appointment (by
whatever appointing authority) of a member to occupy the seat.75 The
appointee to a vacant seat serves three or four months, until the special
election can be held. The appointee to the incapacitated seat serves
some intermediate period-until the member recovers and returns to
office on her own unilateral determination, until the next Congress
begins with a member chosen in a regular two-year or six-year election,
incapacitated members count in the quorum denominator, then that house cannot attain
the quorum necessary to affect those expulsions. More importantly, expulsion remains an
extreme step that neither house should take lightly, especially in a situation in which an
attack on the foundation of the National Government has rendered a member temporarily
unable to carry out the duties of her office. See id. at 548 (emphasizing that the power to
expel on a supermajority should be limited to "extreme cases"). Having 234 incapacitated
representatives can deprive the House of a quorum for two months, too long to be without
a functioning Congress. But it is temporary enough that the remainder of a 101-member
rump House, even a two-thirds supermajority of that rump, should not undo the results of
234 popular elections. See id. at 522 ("The Constitution leaves the House without
authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the
requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution."). Forcing an
injured or ill member out of office "hardly seems a fitting reward for a good and faithful
public servant." Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 136 (making the same argument against
a statutory requirement that a Cabinet officer who temporarily acts as President resign his
Cabinet post only to lose it when the President recovers and resumes the reins of power).
174. See Continuity of Representation Act of 2003, H.R. 2844, 108th Cong. § 2(b)(1)
(2003).
175. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 15; Continuity of Congress
Act of 2003, S. 1820, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2003); see also CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N,
supra note 4, at 25-26 (proposing long-form constitutional amendment, specifying
appointment of acting members to House and Senate seats in which the member is
incapacitated, with the appointment ending upon written certification by the member that
the inability no longer exists).
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or until a vacancy is created by the member's death, resignation, or some
other action.
76
Two problems remain with this approach, however. First, there still
can be no immediate continuity; both houses could be deprived of a
quorum until appointments can be made, perhaps leaving us without a
functioning Congress, and thus a government able to enact new
legislation or declare war, for one week or more. The second problem is
the nature of appointments to incapacitated seats. An acting member of
the House or Senate would be a temporary placeholder drawn from
outside that seat and outside this Congress. She would be a complete
stranger to the office and to the legislative body, lacking any knowledge
or familiarity with what has been happening within the body and, more
importantly, within that legislator's office. It is troubling to imagine the
House comprised of 234 such placeholders, all filling positions for some
period of time in a policy environment with which they are unfamiliar.
Of course, appointments at the interim repopulation stage always place
outsiders in the legislature; the 100 House members and twenty-five
senators appointed to vacant seats would be just as much strangers to
their seats and to Congress.
The difference is the context and temporal indeterminacy of
appointments to incapacitated seats. An appointee to a vacant seat
knows that she will serve a definite period until the special election
within three to six months. She also might run in the special election,
extending her term in the seat on a longer basis.17' The appointee gains a
sense of control or ownership over the seat. Even if only in Congress for
a few months, it is her seat and she exercises the full range of
representative independence and discretion on behalf of her constituents.
By contrast, appointees to incapacitated seats have no such context for
their appointments. The appointee does not know the duration of her
service. Because incapacitated seats never reach final repopulation
unless the seat becomes vacant, if the elected member does not die or
resign but also does not recover (in other words, if the seat does not
become vacant), the appointee might remain in office for the duration of
that term. If we imagine an attack on January 6 of a new Congress, an
176. At that point, the seat moves through temporary repopulation via appointment
and final repopulation via election. We may resolve this concern by providing in enabling
legislation that any appointments last no more than six months, subject to extension if a
large number of vacancies remain. See S. Res. 23, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing
constitutional amendment providing that "[a]ny procedures established . . . shall expire
not later than 120 days after the death or inability of one-fourth of the House of
Representatives or the Senate," but that appointments may be extended for an additional
120 days if one-fourth of the seats remain vacant or incapacitated).
177. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29-30 (recommending that
appointees to vacant seats be permitted to run in the special election for those seats).
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appointee to the House could be in place for two years, an appointee to
the Senate for six years. Alternatively, if the regular member recovers
quickly, the appointee might hold the seat for only two weeks.
This temporal indeterminacy means the appointee may lack the same
independence or the same freedom to exercise her representative
discretion. She might act more as a proxy for the disabled member,
voting as she believes the regular member would have, rather than with a
significant degree of political and policy judgment. Moreover, because
no election could be held until the end of the congressional term, she
would not have the opportunity to win and hold the seat on a longer,
more permanent basis.
One way around the temporal problem of incapacitated seats is for
each member of Congress to establish a political advance directive or
political "living will."'"" Every member would provide a written
statement that in the event of an attack on Congress resulting in the
death or incapacity of some substantial number of members, if that
member is incapacitated in the attack and unable to perform her duties
by a certain time (for example, four months or just prior to the special
elections for vacant seats), she resigns her seat. 79 At that point, the seat
becomes vacant and could be repopulated via appointment and election.
With this rule in place, all appointees, whether to vacant or incapacitated
seats, would serve only until the election (unless the appointee wins that
election). Every seat in both houses, vacant or incapacitated, would be
filled in the post-attack elections that establish final repopulation of
Congress.
However, the problem of temporal indeterminacy remains because the
member still may return at any time within the four-month window,
sending the appointee home and halting the special election for that seat.
Meanwhile, the appointee might continue to lack that independence and
discretion in what may be a time of important legislative activity in
Congress, including the declaration of war or authorization of other
aggressive military and law enforcement activity. °
178. 1 thank Thomas Baker for suggesting this concept.
179. This written statement would be part of the same declaration in which each
member lists the potential appointees from whom the governor could choose if the seat
becomes vacant in the attack. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Congress enacted significant military and
national security legislation in the months following 9/11. See, e.g., Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (establishing provisions regarding law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution
of terrorist activities); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the President to use force against terrorist groups in response
to September 11 attacks, including the Taliban Government that supported A1-Qaeda);
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For purposes of discussion, we might consider an alternative. Do not
make appointments to incapacitated seats. Instead, grant power to both
the House and Senate to examine the capacity of its members in the
wake of a catastrophic attack and, pursuant to emergency rules of
proceeding, to declare incapacitated seats "empty''. and excluded from
the denominator. The denominator under this emergency rule would
be members chosen, sworn, and living who are physically and mentally
capable of performing their job functions-in our examples, 101 House
members, the presence of fifty-one establishing a quorum, and thirty-one
senators, the presence of sixteen establishing a quorum.
This working rump Congress now could function in the immediate
continuity stage."" These seats continue to be deemed empty and
excluded from the quorum, even when vacant seats (seats whose holders
were killed in an attack) have moved through interim and final
repopulation. At that point, for example, the House of Representatives
would operate on a 201-member denominator (including the 100 vacant
seats filled first by appointees and then by members chosen in special
elections), and the Senate would operate on a fifty-six-member
denominator (including the twenty-five vacant seats similarly filled). As
incapacitated members recover and return to work, the denominator in
each house climbs; as incapacitated seats become vacant due to death,
resignation, or otherwise, the seats are repopulated and added back to
the denominator.
The check on abuse of this power to exclude empty seats from the
denominator would be that the incapacitated member decides
unilaterally and unreviewably when she no longer is incapacitated and
can return.'" And the member's view prevails over any contrary opinion
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 114,
107th Cong. (2002).
181. As opposed to "vacant." See supra note 170.
182. This procedure absolutely requires a constitutional amendment superseding the
Quorum Clause and empowering a house to establish a quorum rule that could exclude
some duly chosen, sworn, and living members of that body under some (hopefully) limited
and cabined circumstances. A "majority" of a house under the present Quorum Clause
could exclude vacant seats; it cannot exclude seats that are filled by living members who
simply are unable to attend Congress, regardless of the cause. See supra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text. A quorum rule excluding living-but-incapacitated members must be
made constitutionally permissible by amendment, such as the provision suggested by
Senator Cornyn. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part II.A.
184. See Continuity of Congress Act of 2003, S. 1820, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(3), (b)(3)
(2003) ("A member that has been incapacitated may reclaim his or her office at any time
after such member determines that he or she is no longer incapacitated."); CONTINUITY
OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29 ("[M]embers who are declared incapacitated shall
return to their seats when they declare themselves fit to return to office.").
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of the rest of that house; once the member declares her capacity to act by
appearing at Congress, her seat no longer is empty and is included in the
quorum denominator."" The rule also would be limited to emergencies,
subject to a high-threshold trigger such as death or incapacity of at least
half the House membership and inapplicable where only a small number
of members are incapacitated or disabled.
The obvious problem is that this approach leaves us with the smaller,
unrepresentative Congress for a longer period of time, perhaps until the
end of the term. A quorum to do House business would be established
by the presence of only 101 members, with fifty-one able to enact
legislation, until the next regularly scheduled election. Even if all 201
members of this rump House are popularly elected, the functioning body
still is less than a working majority of the full regular House and might be
geographically, politically, and ideologically different from the pre-attack
body. 16 All the while, the constituents of incapacitated members remain
effectively unrepresented.
On the other hand, every member of Congress is fully vested in her
seat for a defined period, with the leeway to function fully as a
representative. And some incapacitated members will recover and
return to Congress, increasing the size of the House and the denominator
gradually. The political living will rule also helps under this proposal, by
capping the amount of time that a seat could be excluded from the
denominator and thus the amount of time under a skeletal, less
representative Congress. The incapacitated member's advance directive
could provide that if by the time special elections are held following the
catastrophic event the member has not returned, she will be deemed to
have resigned, vacating the seat, and a new member can be chosen from
that state or district in that special election.
Ensuring the continuity of the two institutions that comprise Congress
at the repopulation stages presents a choice between less-than-ideal
options. One possibility gives us two full-capacity houses, with a large
number of appointees and many acting members merely holding space as
185. The only option for the House, if it does not want a member to return, becomes
expulsion by two-thirds vote with all the built-in procedural protections of expulsion,
including having the targeted member herself included in the denominator when
measuring the quorum. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 508-10 (1969) (holding
that an expulsion vote must clearly be a vote for that purpose and rejecting the argument
that exclusion and expulsion are indistinguishable even when two-thirds of members vote
to exclude a member); id. at 553 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that Powell's case was
not one of expulsion, although the analysis would have been different if it were).
186. See supra notes 72-8t.
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proxies for some indeterminate period until the regular member either
returns or dies. Alternatively, we have numerically smaller houses
comprised of fully functioning members, whether elected or appointed
and awaiting election, all serving for definite periods and possessing the
independence and will to exercise a fuller range of discretion.
I suggest that the choice goes in different directions, depending on
whether a seat has been rendered vacant by the member's death or
empty by the member's incapacitation. The difference remains one of
temporal indeterminacy and context of an appointment. A larger
legislative body is preferable, regardless of how members were selected,
when there is certainty as to the length and terms of service, even if the
length is only until an election four months later that comes with
appointment to vacant seats. 8 7 But it may be arguable that a small
legislature comprised of fully empowered and independent members
who truly understand their roles is preferable to one in which a large
number are strangers to the body, only holding space as the proxy for
another for an indeterminate period, perhaps an unacceptably long
period of two or six years.
187. Fixed terms for elected officials are a cornerstone of the republican scheme
established by the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 8, at 190 (James
Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982); see Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice
President, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505, 551 (1995); see supra notes 72-81.
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